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Reassembling surveillance creep 
Abstract
We live in societies in which surveillance technologies are constantly 
introduced, are transformed, and spread to new practices for new 
purposes. How and why does this happen? In other words, why 
does surveillance “creep”? This question has received little attention 
either in theoretical development or in empirical analyses. Accord-
ingly, this article contributes by demonstrating how Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) can advance our understanding of ‘surveillance 
creep’. Based on ANT’s model of translation and a historical study 
of the Danish DNA database, we argue that surveillance creep in-
volves reassembling the relations in surveillance networks between 
heterogeneous actors such as the watchers, the watched, laws, and 
technologies. Second, surveillance creeps only when these heteroge-
neous actors are adequately interested and aligned. However, ob-
taining and maintaining such alignment may be difficult. 
Keywords surveillance, creep, Actor-Network Theory, translation, 
DNA databases
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Introduction
When the Danish police implemented their DNA database in the 
year 2000, it was a tool for preventing and investigating a limited 
set of serious crimes. Only a small group of individuals were to be 
registered in the database: those who had been charged with crimes 
such as terrorism, homicide, sexual assaults, battery, and arson 
(Justitsministeriet 2000). Today, however, the database is an inte-
grated part of all types of police investigation. Anyone may be 
registered by the police in the DNA database if they have been 
charged with a criminal offence incurring a prison sentence of 18 
months or more. The database has grown rapidly, and today it 
holds the DNA profiles of more than 110,000 people. In parallel 
with the increase in the database’s scale and scope, the individu-
als registered in it are now subject to control not only by the Dan-
ish authorities but, following the European Union (EU) Prüm 
Treaty, by all EU police forces, who can order searches in each 
other’s DNA databases.
Such developments are frequently described as “surveillance 
creep” or “function creep” (Nelkin and Andrews 2002; Marx 2005; 
Pierpoint 2011). Scholars of surveillance have characterised these 
phenomena as key dynamics in the formation of surveillance socie-
ties (e.g. Haggerty and Ericson 2005, 18). Yet these notions of creep 
are rarely distinguished, subjected either to empirical analyses or to 
theoretical discussion. Instead, they are used for criticising un-
checked and undemocratic diffusions of surveillance in society 
(Webster 2009; Ball, Haggerty and Lyon ed. 2012; Fuchs 2013). Con-
cepts and analyses are therefore in short supply which can guide 
our understanding not only of how surveillance technologies pro-
liferate but also of how that proliferation contributes to the devel-
opment of surveillance societies.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how Actor-Net-
work Theory (ANT) can be used to understand “creep”. ANT’s 
focus on chains of translation is useful for understanding how 
technologies move through society and are transformed in the 
process. Although we focus specifically on surveillance creep, 
ANT is an approach that makes it possible to study all kinds of 
technological creep.
The choice of ANT as a theoretical framework has a number of 
implications. First, surveillance creep is not seen as an automatic 
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diffusion of surveillance in society. Rather, creep is seen to occur 
when actors take up and reassemble the heterogeneous relations in 
surveillance networks – between e.g. the watchers, laws, technolo-
gies, and the watched – to suit their own purposes. Surveillance 
creep is therefore not necessarily a negative phenomenon, but is 
simply understood as a relation between the spread and transfor-
mation of technologies. Second, surveillance creep can only happen 
when these actors are adequately aligned. Such alignments may be 
difficult to obtain and maintain. Betrayal or conflict may lead to 
disalignment, which could cause the new network to dissolve or 
end up in a state of limbo (Latour 1996). 
In the article, we demonstrate these ideas through two stories of 
surveillance creep from the history of the Danish DNA database 
(Bøge 2015). The first case of creep concerned a shift in the purpose 
of the database from being a tool meant for investigating serious 
crimes to one aimed predominantly at burglary. This shift occurred 
as a local police district created a new practice of investigation by 
changing the relations between laws, technologies, and the people at 
whom they were aimed. The second occurrence of creep concerned 
the transformation of the DNA database from a national tool of in-
vestigation to a node in a European network of DNA databases. In 
this story, we see how making surveillance creep can be difficult 
when actors are disaligned, and how creep is stalled because of it.
Surveillance creep as translating 
interests and aligning actors
“Creep” is often used to describe a perpetually evolving under-
growth of alterations in surveillance practices and technologies 
which are often difficult to perceive and which can have negative 
consequences (Marx 1988; Pierpoint 2011). In surveillance discours-
es, creep has to do with changes which lead away from the original 
purpose of surveillance technologies or practices (Dahl and Sætnan 
2009; Lyon 2007, 201). Such changes may occur when, for example, 
collected data are suddenly used in a different way when new func-
tions are added to a surveillance system, or when technology 
spreads from one sphere in society to another (Bøge 2015). As men-
tioned, despite the importance of such phenomena for our under-
standing of the surveillance society, there has been little theoretical 
discussion or empirical investigations.
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According to David Lyon (2007, 52), surveillance creep is often 
understood from a technological determinist perspective (Ellul 
1964; Winner 1977). In this perspective, surveillance technologies 
will automatically spread through society and change it to fit an 
intrinsic logic. Such interpretations mirror public discussions of 
surveillance, which see it as an existential threat to democratic so-
ciety. Although David Lyon and others warn against technologi-
cal determinism, this understanding still seems to thrive in stud-
ies of surveillance.
Yet other interpretations also exist. For instance, Dahl and Sætnan 
(2009) employ ideas from Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) 
to explain surveillance/function creep. They argue that creep occurs 
because the users are creative, because surveillance technologies 
have interpretive flexibility, and because of shifts in the “moral ter-
rain” once surveillance technologies have been installed.
In this article, we are also pursuing a constructivist line of 
thought, but from a different angle. In general ANT enables an un-
derstanding of surveillance as networks in which human and non-
human actors are arranged and aligned. At the same time, ANT 
contains a specific theory about how creep can be understood. This 
is the model of translation (Latour 1984; Callon 1986), which is ex-
plained through its contrasting (technologically determinist) model 
of diffusion. In the model of diffusion, technologies are endowed by 
their creator with an original inner force or inertia which sets them 
in motion until they meet resistance. Conversely, society is under-
stood as a medium of resistance, which stops or slows down the 
technology. In other words, the technology moves through an al-
ready existing society and if the technology has sufficient impetus, 
it will penetrate society without changing its character. Thus what 
needs to be explained and understood according to this model is 
not the successful spread of a technology, but rather the societal 
forces that set obstacles in its path. In the context of surveillance 
creep, this is akin to saying that cameras have spread from banks 
and high-risk areas to stores and public spaces because no social 
resistance was encountered.
In the ANT model of translation, the inertia of technologies and 
resistance in societies are taken away. There is no energy that can 
be conserved, and no a priori distribution of agency. Instead, it is 
argued that:
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“... the spread in time and space of anything – claims, or-
ders, artefacts, goods – is in the hands of people; each of 
these people may act in many different ways, letting the 
token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or adding to 
it, or appropriating it [...] In other words, there is no iner-
tia to account for the spread of a token. When no one is 
there to take up the statement or the token then it simply 
stops.” (Latour 1984, 267).
If we accept the model of translation, we must try to identify and 
describe the moments of translation in order to understand the prolif-
eration of technologies or surveillance creep. Translations, in La-
tour’s terminology, are processes by which actors are drawn togeth-
er or apart. During moments of translation human and non-human 
actors are interested, enrolled, mobilised or displaced in networks 
around technologies or ideas, which are made more or less real in 
the process. The socio-technical is thus formed through transla-
tions, and both the ideas/technologies and the networks around 
them are likely to change when actors are added to the network. 
Importantly, these translations do not stop simply because technol-
ogies are implemented in practice. As de Laet and Mol (2000) have 
demonstrated, translations of technologies continue long after they 
are seemingly “black boxed,” which makes them appear “fluid”. 
When surveillance technologies undergo continuous translations of 
this kind after their implementation in a way that changes their 
purpose, we can identify them as surveillance creep. This idea is 
demonstrated in our first story.
Importantly, ANT asserts that aligning an adequate network of 
actors in a common cause and keeping them aligned can be a dif-
ficult task. Enabling surveillance creep can therefore be hard work. 
It may require creative acts of seduction, persuasion, brute force or 
even Machiavellian strategies to keep everyone in check (Latour 
1987). Actors are considered to be volatile, and the betrayal of just 
a few actors can in the worst-case scenario lead to the dissolution 
of the whole network (Callon 1986). However, ANT also opens up 
the possibility that ideas or technologies can become stuck in lim-
bo as the networks around them become temporarily disaligned 
without collapsing. Bruno Latour’s (1996) study of the French 
high-tech automated subway system called “Aramis” exemplifies 
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a prolonged version of this state of existence in recounting the slow 
demise of a glorious project. A similar situation is demonstrated in 
our second story.
Lastly, in this game of “adequate alignment,” technologies are 
not passive entities merely open to interpretation or objects that are 
simply “picked up.” Technologies and other non-human actors 
have agency, according to ANT. They may interest human actors 
and ascribe roles to them or resist enrolment. They bend the space 
and time around human actors and are able to make them more (or 
even less) moral. For instance, Latour describes how speedbumps 
pose a threat to fast-moving cars and therefore force us to drive 
more carefully, while the availability of weapons may cause us to 
seek rapid and violent solutions to problems (Latour 1992; 1999).
Two stories of the Danish DNA database 
and surveillance creep
We turn now to analysing two historical instances of surveillance 
creep in the context of the Danish DNA database. Through these 
stories, we illustrate our two main theoretical points: first, that sur-
veillance creep occurs when actors take up and reassemble the het-
erogeneous relations of surveillance networks; and second, that 
surveillance creep requires an adequate alignment in the new con-
stellation, but that this may be difficult to obtain.
First story: from murderers and rapists to burglars and pushers
In January 2001, the Danish DNA database was six months old. It 
contained the DNA profiles of some 400 people in addition to 300 
unidentified biological samples. At this point, the database soft-
ware had found its very first hits. But the results were surprising, 
because the hits contained DNA profiles from burglars. This was 
surprising because the database had been implemented by the Dan-
ish parliament primarily to investigate homicide, sexual assault, 
arson, and battery. Burglary had never been mentioned in the six 
years of political debates or the stream of official documents on the 
DNA database prior to its implementation, and registration of bur-
glars in the DNA database was not permitted. What had changed 
the purpose of the DNA database and caused this surveillance 
creep? In this first story, we show that this surveillance creep oc-
curred because a local police department wanted to solve their bur-
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glary problem and created a new investigatory practice by reassem-
bling the relations between the law, new technologies and the 
burglars. Furthermore, we describe how other police departments 
take up the new practice and normalises it but also changes it for 
their own purposes.   
The surveillance creep began in the autumn of 2000 on the Dan-
ish island of Bornholm. In order to combat “an epidemic of burgla-
ries,” the local police force decided on a new initiative and figured 
out a way to exploit the new police DNA database. As mentioned, 
the database had been implemented for investigating specific seri-
ous crimes; the police were not permitted to register persons who 
had been identified as having been charged with burglary. How-
ever, the Bornholm police force found a way to use the DNA data-
base for their new purpose by aligning three actors into a new prac-
tice, which caused the database to creep.
The first actor was a new and improved DNA analysis technique 
(PCR). The old technique (RFLP) required visible amounts of blood 
or semen. DNA analyses had therefore not been used in burglary 
investigations. The new technique, however, made it possible to 
create DNA profiles from minuscule biological traces such as the 
saliva on cigarette butts or on used soft-drink bottles. In ANT terms, 
the new technique translated the police’s crime scenes and filled 
them with new potential traces of DNA. The second actor was the 
burglars themselves. The police had observed that burglars tended 
to leave these specific traces behind. DNA profiles could now be 
extracted from the cigarette butts or soft-drink bottles that police 
frequently found left behind at crimes scenes. The burglars them-
selves thus became inscribed as actors in this surveillance creep (see 
also Albrechtslund and Lauritsen 2013). The third important actor 
was a loophole in the law regulating the DNA database. This loop-
hole meant that although identified burglars could not be registered, 
the police could register unidentified DNA profiles from all the bio-
logical traces left at all crime scenes – including burglaries – in the 
DNA database.
In combination, these three actors allowed the Bornholm police 
to use the DNA database to target their burglary problem in a crea-
tive fashion. A new investigatory practice was established, whereby 
the Bornholm police would carefully search for and collect used 
soft-drink bottles and cigarette butts likely to have been left behind 
kvarter
a ademisk
academic quarter
Volume
15 34
Reassembling surveillance creep 
Ask Risom Bøge
Peter Lauritsen 
by the unsuspecting burglars, then ask the national police to store 
the DNA profiles drawn from these traces in the DNA database. 
When individuals were charged with burglary, they were then also 
required to give a blood sample for a DNA profile. This was com-
pared with the DNA database, but not registered in the database, as 
this would have been against the law.
The new practice was publicised in the early months of 2001, 
when the Bornholm police succeeded in catching a burglar whose 
DNA profile, when it was searched in the DNA database, matched 
four unidentified DNA profiles. The hit led to a wider investigation 
and the burglar was eventually charged with 44 counts of burglary 
and theft. This was a great success for the new practice, which had 
shown its potential. The case was reportedly followed closely by 
the national police, as this was the first time the DNA database had 
been used in this way. In the following years, the practice became 
normalised: most police districts took it up and applied it in their 
own work. Thus, in 2004, the number of unidentified DNA profiles 
from burglaries in the DNA database greatly exceeded all other 
types of identified and unidentified DNA profiles combined. But 
the practice had also been translated by different police districts for 
their own purposes. For instance, in Copenhagen the police began 
collecting DNA evidence from cigarette butts and soft-drink bottles 
during raids on hash markets, with a view to connecting pushers to 
the pusher stands they so quickly abandoned when the police 
showed up. Such different uses were possible because the connec-
tions made between the new DNA analysis technique and the loop-
hole in the DNA database regulations were so broad.
A new practice had thus been created by the Danish police 
through the successful translation of technology, law, and the bur-
glars themselves by a local police force enacted in order to solve a 
specific problem. The practice spread and became normalised af-
ter a spectacular success, which in turn informed other police dis-
tricts and became the dominant way of using the database. But it 
was also taken up and translated by police districts for additional 
purposes. Finally in 2005, the Danish parliament agreed to ex-
pand the DNA database so that burglars, pushers, and most other 
criminals charged with crimes bearing prison sentences could be 
registered as well.
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Second story: building an international surveillance network
In the first story, the burglars and pushers, the DNA technologies, 
and the laws were brought together quite easily by the police. How-
ever, this is not always so easy as the same kinds of actors may resist 
being enrolled and aligned. The following short account illustrates 
such difficulties of alignment. We describe the efforts made to trans-
late the various national European DNA databases into a compre-
hensive surveillance network, as well as the problems with aligning 
laws, DNA profiles, software, and politicians.
When the Danish DNA database was decided on, it was intend-
ed as a tool for investigation and control by the Danish police. 
However, as with the first story of surveillance creep, the purpose 
of the database became imperceptibly broadened as it was used to 
support other European countries’ police investigations. By 2004, 
the exchange of DNA profiles with other EU police forces had be-
come normal. As the head of the DNA section at the Danish na-
tional police explains, “We have perhaps a couple of hundred DNA 
profiles from unsolved crimes in other countries in our database” 
(Søgaard 2004). This statement was made to the Danish press after 
the practice had helped connect a Danish man to a murder in Nor-
way. But bilateral exchanges of DNA profiles like these were only 
the beginning of a much more extensive surveillance creep. Simul-
taneously, a development was taking place within the EU whereby 
member states sought to connect all their DNA databases in a Eu-
ropean network. On 27 May 2005, representatives of seven EU 
countries gathered in the German city of Prüm agreed on a treaty 
intended to intensify EU cross-border police cooperation. Three 
years later, on 23 June 2008, important parts of the treaty became 
elevated to EU law. Among other things, the treaty envisioned con-
necting all EU member states’ police DNA databases. Rather than 
providing full access, member state police forces would be able to 
ask each other’s DNA databases to search for specific DNA profiles 
and get an automatic “hit” or “no hit” response within 15 minutes. 
The network was supposed to be in place by August 2011. How-
ever, a series of actors proved difficult to align. As Barbara Prain-
sack and Victor Toom (who have described the history in greater 
detail) have argued (2012), the story of Prüm has been “heteroge-
neous and halting” rather than “linear and harmonious.”
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First, not all EU countries had DNA databases in 2008. Those that 
did not had to implement them, and several governments had 
problems “with mobilising political majorities to adapt national 
law to the Prüm provisions” (Prainsack and Toom 2012, 75). Sec-
ond, the DNA profiles differed from member state to member state, 
as they had been defined based on national genetic compositions. 
In 2008 there was only a partial overlap between the systems in the 
various DNA profiles. This was problematic because it was proven 
that the partial comparability combined with the hugely increased 
numbers of comparisons in the new network could lead to false 
positives. Only after intense collaboration between geneticists 
across Europe was it possible to create and standardise a set of com-
mon DNA systems, which has now been added to the member 
states’ original DNA profiles. Third, many of the DNA database 
software systems controlling the member state DNA databases had 
been “home-grown” and so could not be made to communicate 
with the other databases. These systems had to be replaced. This 
proved not only technically difficult, but slow and expensive. This 
in particular is the reason why the network is only partially func-
tional five years after it was supposed to be fully implemented. 
While the network is working for core countries such as Germany, 
the Danish DNA database, like those of some other countries, is not 
yet fully connected. Lastly, Britain’s exit from the EU will mean that 
the largest DNA database in the union will cease to be a partner in 
the network.
The lack of DNA databases and political majorities, differing 
DNA profiles and differing DNA database systems are all examples 
of disalignments that have slowed down the effort to create an in-
ternational network of European DNA databases. Several of these 
problems have been solved, or are expected to be solved soon, but 
the point remains: aligning actors and achieving surveillance creep 
can be hard work.
Conclusion
The concept of surveillance creep addresses a fundamental dynam-
ic whereby surveillance societies are created and maintained. It is 
therefore surprising that so few attempts to study and discuss sur-
veillance creep have been made. 
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In this article, we have demonstrated that ANT offers concepts 
and ideas that are productive for this purpose. Through ANT and 
our analyses of the historical development of the Danish DNA da-
tabase we learn that surveillance does not creep simply because of 
creative actors or technological impetus. Rather, surveillance creep 
can be seen as the art of reassembling existing surveillance net-
works. This involves a translation of interests and the achieving of 
adequate alignments between heterogeneous actors such as laws, 
technologies, the watchers and the watched in order to shift the 
purpose of surveillance technologies or practices. Importantly, 
while these developments may appear fluid as actors continue to 
re-shape practices for their own purposes, the processes are not au-
tomatic. In fact, rearranging relations may be hard work. 
ANT can contribute to our understanding of surveillance creep 
but further empirical and theoretical work is needed. In particu-
lar, studies are needed to understand phenomena like the rapid 
spread of surveillance cameras, the mushrooming of government 
databases, and parents’ increasing surveillance of their children 
through smartphones.
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